

**Security Module with Volatile Memory
for Storing an Algorithm Code**

10 Cross-Reference to Related Application:

This application is a continuation of copending International Application No. PCT/EP02/00733, filed January 24, 2002, which designated the United States and was not published in English.

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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention:

20 The present invention relates to security modules, as employed for example for pay TV applications, credit cards, telephone cards or as TPM plug-in cards, and refers in particular to securing the algorithm code that is employed for the communication between security module and terminal
25 against external attacks.

2. Description of the related art:

30 With the increasing advent of cashless payment traffic and the increasing information-technological networking as far as into individual households, such as e.g. in case of pay TV applications, there is an increasing demand for cryptographic algorithms in order to be able to perform digital signatures, authentications and encryption tasks. Known
35 cryptographic algorithms comprise asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as e.g. the RSA algorithm, symmetric encryption processes, such as e.g. the DSE process, as well as processes based on elliptic curves.

5 In order to be able to perform the computations prescribed
by the cryptographic algorithms in everyday life with an
acceptable speed on the one hand and in as convenient man-
ner for the user as possible on the other hand, chip cards,
such as smart cards or signature cards, are employed com-
10 prising an individually provided cryptographic processor
for implementing the cryptographic algorithm. Depending on
the particular application or use, the cryptographic proc-
essor must be capable of performing authentications, signa-
tures, certifications and encryptions or decryptions in ac-
15 cordance with different cryptographic algorithms. In addi-
tion to implementation of the cryptographic algorithms, the
chip card contains stored, chip card-specific information,
such as a secret key and, in case of a credit card, the
credit card number, the account number and the balance and,
20 in case of a pay TV smart card, a smart card ID, a customer
ID and other customer-specific information. A chip card en-
ables the user of the chip card to carry out certain trans-
actions, such as e.g. debiting, on specifically provided
terminals or other end apparatus, such as pay TV decoders,
25 in simple and efficient manner. In this regard, the crypto-
graphic algorithms implemented on the chip card provide for
protection of the chip card traffic against criminal ma-
nipulations.

30 For protecting chip card terminal systems against criminal
manipulations, specific protocols are employed between ter-
minal and chip card, comprising e.g. mutual authentication
as well as encryption and decryption operations making use
of the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the crypto-
35 graphic processor. A problem with conventional chip cards
consists in that the algorithms used for the secret func-
tions, e.g. for encryption, are fixedly provided on the
chip card in the form of a fixed wiring and/or in stored
form and thus are susceptible to being spied out by poten-
40 tial attackers. Spying out of cryptographic algorithms im-
plemented in chip cards by an attacker comprises, for exam-

5 ple, the chemical removal of the circuit structure of the
cryptographic processor and the optical analysis of the ex-
posed semiconductor structures. If an attacker, by way of
the chip card in his possession, succeeds in obtaining the
cryptographic algorithm implemented therein, the attacker
10 will be in the position, due to his knowledge of the cryp-
tographic algorithm and thus by the possibility of imple-
menting the same, to carry out certain attacks against the
chip card in order to obtain the secret data, such as the
secret key or other data of crucial security of the chip
15 card. When the underlying cryptographic algorithm is known,
the attacks have a by far greater chance of success, and
consequently the security chain of the chip card traffic is
at risk.

20 With conventional chip cards, the problem of spying out is
counteracted merely by specific hardware processes or tech-
nologies, such as by the hidden contact process. In case of
this process, attempts are made to prevent the optical
analysis of removed semiconductor structures and thus a
25 conclusion to the underlying electronic circuit by means of
hidden contacts and by the use of specific layout libraries
for the underlying gates, in which different gates, such as
AND gates and OR gates, differ from each other merely by
different doping. These hardware concealing measures indeed
30 increase the expenditure for finding out the underlying
cryptographic algorithms for the potential attacker, but on
the other hand increase also the circuitry and design ex-
penditure, the chip area and thus the costs of the crypto-
graphic processor and the chip card, respectively.

35 A chip card with increased security against foreign attacks
and reduced circuit expenditure is very attractive for chip
card manufacturers in particular with regard to the high
market potential and the large numbers of pieces in which
40 chip cards are produced.

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SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is the object of the present invention to make available a security module, a terminal and a process such that security module traffic with a higher level of security may be
10 ensured.

In accordance with a first aspect of the invention, this
15 aspect is achieved by a security module for use with a terminal, comprising a data interface adapted to be coupled to a terminal, for receiving at least part of an algorithm code or of the complete algorithm code from the terminal, with the algorithm code concerning a processing of secrets,
20 an energy interface for receiving supply energy from the terminal; a volatile memory for storing the part of the algorithm code or the complete algorithm code received via the data interface, said volatile memory being coupled to the energy interface in order to have energy supplied
25 thereto such that the same will be cleared upon an interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the terminal; and a processor for performing the algorithm code in order to obtain an algorithm code result that can be delivered to the terminal.

30

In accordance with a second aspect of the invention, this aspect is achieved by a terminal for use with a security module, comprising: a data interface adapted to be coupled to the security module, for transmitting at least part of
35 an algorithm code or the complete algorithm code from the terminal to a volatile memory of the security module and for receiving the algorithm code result from the security module, with the algorithm code concerning a processing of secrets; and an energy interface for delivering supply energy to the security module, with the volatile memory being
40 supplied by the supply energy, such that the same will be

5 cleared upon an interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the terminal, with the terminal, for each communication operation between terminal and security module during one and the same communication operation with the security module, being designated to send at least the part
10 of the algorithm code or the complete algorithm code to the volatile memory of the security module; and, subsequently, during the further communication process, receive the algorithm code result from the security module.

15 In accordance with a third aspect of the invention, this aspect is achieved by a process for computing an algorithm code result using a security module, comprising the steps of: receiving at least part of an algorithm code or the complete algorithm code by means of an energy interface,
20 with the algorithm code concerning a processing of secrets; volatile-storing said part of the algorithm code or said complete algorithm code in a volatile memory of the security module, with the volatile memory being coupled to the energy interface, to be supplied with energy, such that the
25 same will be cleared upon an interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the terminal: performing said algorithm code on the security module in order to obtain an algorithm code result; delivering said algorithm code result to the terminal; and clearing said volatile memory upon an
30 interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the terminal.

In accordance with a fourth aspect of the invention, this aspect is achieved by a process for controlling a security
35 module using a terminal in order to obtain an algorithm code result from the security module, with the process comprising for each communication operation, performing the following steps during one and the same communication operation with the security module: delivering supply energy
40 from the terminal to the security module; transmitting at least part of an algorithm code or the complete algorithm

5 code from the terminal to a volatile memory of the security
module; with the algorithm code concerning a processing of
secrets, with the volatile memory being supplied by the
supply energy, such that the same will be cleared upon an
interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the
10 terminal; and receiving the algorithm code result from the
security module.

In accordance with a fifth aspect of the invention, this
aspect is achieved by a process for communication between a
15 security module and a terminal, comprising the steps of:
transferring at least part of an algorithm code or the
complete algorithm code from the terminal to the security
module, with the algorithm code concerning a processing of
secrets; volatile-storing said part of the algorithm code
20 or said complete algorithm code in a volatile memory of the
security module, with the volatile memory being supplied by
the supply energy; such that the same will be cleared upon
interruption of the receipt of the supply energy from the
terminal; performing said algorithm code on the security
25 module in order to obtain an algorithm code result; deliv-
ering said algorithm code result to the terminal; and
clearing said volatile memory upon an interruption of the
receipt of the supply energy from the terminal.

30 The present invention is based on the finding that the se-
curity of a security module, such as e.g. a chip card,
against foreign attacks may be enhanced in that at least
part of the algorithm code is not fixedly stored on the se-
curity module, but rather that this missing part of the al-
35 gorithm code is stored in a volatile memory of the security
module during communication between the terminal and the
security module only, with the algorithm code comprising
functions of crucial security, such as debiting functions,
or cryptographic algorithms or concerning the processing of
40 secrets in general. It is thus effectively prevented that
the complete algorithm code is provided on a security mod-

5 ule in the power of a potential attacker, and consequently
it will become impossible for the potential attacker to ac-
cess the algorithm code in order to spy out secret keys or
other secret data, and to run or perform the same in accor-
10 dance with specific attack processes, using e.g. fault at-
tacks or information leakage attacks. In other words, it
will be made nearly impossible to a potential attacker to
utilize the algorithm code, such as an encryption algo-
rithm, in abusive manner since this code is not permanently
stored on the security module in complete form and thus,
15 outside the utilization at a corresponding terminal, is not
in the possession of the attacker.

According to the invention, a security module, such as a
chip card, comprises a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) in the
20 form of a computer plug-in module or a smart card, for use
with a terminal in addition to a data interface adapted to
be coupled to the terminal and receiving from the terminal
at least part of the algorithm code or the complete algo-
rithm code, an energy interface receiving supply energy, as
25 well as a volatile memory for storing the part of the algo-
rithm code received via the data interface or of the com-
plete algorithm code received, with the volatile memory be-
ing coupled to the energy interface in order to have energy
supplied thereto. A processor performs the algorithm code
30 in order to obtain an algorithm code result that can be de-
livered to the terminal. The not received remainder of the
algorithm code may be stored, for example, in a non-
volatile memory, such as a ROM, of the security module. If
there is not sufficient supply energy present, there is
35 thus no complete algorithm code contained in the non-
volatile memory of the security module, and consequently
there is no complete algorithm code available to be run by
a potential attacker.

40 A terminal suitable for use with the security module de-
scribed hereinbefore, such as e.g. an automatic cash dis-

5 penser, a mobile telephone with card reader, a pay TV de-
 coder or a computer having a plug-in place for a TPM, com-
 prises for example a data interface that is adapted to be
 coupled to the security module and transmits the part of
10 the algorithm code or the complete algorithm code from the
 terminal to the volatile memory of the security module and
 receives the algorithm code result from the security mod-
 ule, as well as an energy interface delivering the supply
 energy to the security module.

15 According to a specific embodiment, an authentication, such
 as an authentication according to the challenge and re-
 sponse scheme, is carried out between the terminal and the
 security module during a communication between terminal and
20 security module. The transfer of the algorithm code from
 the terminal to the security module is carried out in en-
 crypted and certified form in order to counteract eaves-
 dropping and manipulation of the communication connection
 between terminal and security module. The terminal or the
25 security module to this end contains suitable means for
 performing authentication, encryption and decryption as
 well as certification and certification examination, re-
 spectively. For increased security and for effectively pre-
 venting access of a potential attacker to the transferred
30 part of the algorithm code, the security module may have in
 addition a monitoring means which, if predetermined secu-
 rity conditions are fulfilled, clears the volatile memory.
 Such security conditions may comprise the interruption, an
 irregularity and a fluctuation in the supply voltage and/or
35 the processor or system clock or other operating parameters
 as they may be effected by manipulation of the security
 module while the latter interacts with the terminal. In the
 event that the monitoring means has not effected prelimi-
 nary clearing of the memory, the volatile memory and thus
40 the part stored of the algorithm code is cleared at the
 latest upon termination of the communication between termi-
 nal and security module or upon interruption of the supply

5 energy, respectively, such as e.g. by withdrawal or removal of the security module from the terminal, whereby this part of the algorithm code is no longer available to a potential attacker for performing in the scope of specific attacks.

10 In order to further reduce the attackability of the system, it may be provided to transfer the part of the algorithm code from the terminal to the security module intermittently in modified form and repeatedly and, in doing so, to store each time the newly transferred, altered part of the
15 algorithm code in the volatile memory instead of the old stored part of the algorithm code. This renders possible changes in a cryptographic algorithm during the communication between terminal and security module, such as e.g. in case of pay TV applications, but also changes in the algorithm code each time upon initialization of a terminal-
20 security module communication, such as e.g. in case of credit cards, whereby it is further aggravated for a potential attacker to adjust to, or find out, the algorithm code employed.

25 In addition to protecting the algorithm code of the security module against spying out by a potential attacker, an additional advantage of the present invention consists in that it is applicable to a multiplicity of application
30 fields, such as e.g. EC cards, credit cards, multi-application cards or pay TV smart cards. Depending on the particular application, the algorithm code or security function code received by the security module contains parts of a code for functions of crucial security or one or
35 more cryptographic algorithms of the security module. For chip card producers or producers of security modules, the versatile applicability as well as the enhanced security against potential attacks means increased acceptance in the market and thus an increased market share. In addition
40 thereto, the security of the security module is increased in inexpensive manner as the increased security is achieved

5 by software loading of the volatile memory. The conventional and complex hardware measures for protecting the algorithm code against potential attackers, as described hereinbefore, may either be carried out in addition or be replaced by less expensive hardware techniques since the
10 functions of crucial security or the underlying cryptographic algorithm of the security module are not permanently provided on the chip card.

Further developments and further alternative embodiments of
15 the present invention are defined in the attached dependent claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

20 Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be elucidated in detail hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings in which

Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram illustrating the sequence of operations during communication of a
25 chip card with a terminal according to the present invention;

Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of a chip card structure according to an embodiment of the present invention; and
30

Fig. 3 shows a terminal construction according to an embodiment of the present invention.
35

Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments

It is pointed out that the following detailed description of specific embodiments of the present invention refers to
40 chip card applications by way of example only, and that the present invention is also applicable to other security mod-

5 ules, such as TPMs in the form of plug-in cards; the following description may easily be transferred to such applications. Accordingly, the following description also refers to terminals for chip cards, such as e.g. cash dispensing machines, by way of example only, although a terminal according to the present invention, in other fields of application, may also be a computer, for example, having a TPM in the plug-in spaces thereof, or a mobile telephone with a smart card in the card reader thereof, or the terminal may generally be an arbitrary apparatus capable of communicating with the security module.

Reference is made first to Fig. 1, illustrating the sequence of operations during communication between a terminal and a chip card, as it results for example when a chip card is introduced into a terminal. In case of chargeable radio broadcasting, the chip card may be, for example, a pay TV smart card and the terminal may be the respective end apparatus or decoder of a pay TV customer. In the event the chip card is a credit card, the terminal is a cash dispensing machine, for example.

Fig. 1 illustrates the chip card 10 and the terminal 20 beside each other in the form of rectangles with rounded corners. Underneath the same, the various steps carried out during communication or interaction of the chip card 10 with the terminal 20 are shown schematically by arrows and blocks in downward direction in the sequence of their occurrence. The directions of the arrows indicate the directions of the data flows in which the data are transmitted, whereas the blocks represent measures performed in the chip card 10.

The steps illustrated in Fig. 1 have the prerequisite that a communication is already possible between the terminal and the chip card which, for example, may be the case upon introduction of the chip card into the terminal; in this

5 regard, the terminal 20 may be a contactless or contact
terminal, and the communication connection thus may take
place without contact or via a contact. It is necessary
furthermore for communication that chip card 10 be supplied
10 in contactless manner via electromagnetic radiation or via
a contact. After the communication connection between terminal 20 and chip card 10 has been established and supply
energy has been supplied to chip card 10, initializing
steps may be carried out first, such as e.g. the mutual
15 agreement on the relevant protocol etc.

After the steps (not shown) of supplying energy to the chip
card 10, establishing the communication connection as well
as initializing the communication between terminal 20 and
20 chip card 10, mutual authentication between terminal 20 and
chip card 10 is carried out in a step 30, e.g. an authentication
in accordance with the challenge and response process. The mutual authentication may comprise, for example,
the inputting of a PIN (Personal Identification Number) by
25 the card user, in which the mutual authentication 30 makes
use, for example, of chip card-specific data stored on the
chip card 10, such as e.g. a chip card identification number
and a personal identification number, in connection
with a chip card key stored on the chip card as well as an
30 authentication code stored on the chip card and representing
a cryptographic algorithm, such as e.g. a symmetric or
an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. The authentication
serves to make sure that only admitted chip cards may communicate
with admitted terminals. If the authentication
35 yields an error, the communication connection is terminated.

Upon successful mutual authentication 30, the terminal 20
in a step 40 transmits part of the algorithm code to the
40 chip card 10 in encrypted and certified form. The encryption
of the transferred part of the algorithm code protects

5 the transmission against eavesdropping by a potential at-
tacker, while the certification in the terminal 20 of the
chip card 10 is to provide a guarantee as to the origin of
the transferred part of the algorithm code. For decryption
10 of the transferred part of the algorithm code and for exam-
ining the certificate as well as for performing the mutual
authentication 30, the chip card 10 comprises suitable au-
thentication, decryption and certificate examining means
which are constituted by part of the hardware and by codes
15 e.g. the authentication code. The cryptographic algorithms
underlying said mutual authentication 30 and said encryp-
tion and certification 40 may comprise symmetric or asym-
metric cryptographic processes, such as e.g. the RSA or the
DES algorithm or an arbitrary other cryptographic algo-
20 rithm.

In case the certificate examination reveals that the cer-
tificate lacks genuineness, the communication between ter-
minal 20 and chip card 10 is interrupted, and there may be
25 provisions made that the chip card 10 does not longer carry
out processings for a predetermined period of time. It is
thus avoided that a potential attacker taps the communica-
tion connection between terminal 20 and chip card 10 and
enters a "false" code to the volatile memory of the chip
30 card 10 which, upon performing by the chip card 10, could
effect the outputting of secret data stored on chip card
10, for example.

If the certificate examination revealed the genuineness of
35 the certificate, the transferred part of the algorithm code
is then stored, in a step 50, in a volatile memory of chip
card 10 either in encrypted or in decrypted form. Depending
on encrypted or decrypted storage, the algorithm code is
decrypted before storage thereof or before performing by a
40 cryptographic processor on chip card 10. The algorithm code
having a part thereof transferred in step 40 may comprise

5 the program code of one or a plurality of functions of crucial security of the chip card 10, such as e.g. a debiting or crediting function for charging or discharging the chip card 10, or the program code for performing a cryptographic algorithm necessary during the further communication sequence, such as e.g. a symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic process, an RSA algorithm, encryption according to the DES standard, an elliptic curve process or another secret algorithm, however without restriction to these examples. In the event of a pay TV application, the algorithm code comprises, for example, information with respect to decryption of the television data of a chargeable program, such as e.g. the re permutation of the image lines of an image of the television data. Consequently, the algorithm code to be protected is present in complete form on chip card 10 only during the time of execution of the communication between terminal 20 and chip card 10.

In a step 60, the algorithm code now contained in complete form on chip card 10 is utilized and performed by a processor provided on the chip card 10. In the afore-mentioned pay TV example, the processor of chip card 10 performs, for example, the re permutation of the image lines of the television images by way of the algorithm code stored. In a debit application of the chip card 10, such as e.g. with telephone cards, the algorithm code indicating a debiting or crediting function is used for example for crediting or debiting a balance provided on the chip card 10. With credit card applications, step 60 comprises for example the performing of the algorithm code indicating a cryptographic algorithm by means of a cryptographic processor of chip card 10 in order to place money transfer orders, for example.

In a step 70, the part of the algorithm code stored in the volatile memory is cleared again. Clearing of the algorithm code may be effected, for example, by taking out the chip

5 card 10 from terminal 10 by the card user and by thus interrupting the delivery of supply energy from terminal 20 to chip card 10. For preventing attempts of potential attackers to protect the volatile memory, e.g. a RAM, against loss of the stored part of the algorithm code, whereby
10 these would come into possession of the complete algorithm code, the chip card 10 may have a specific monitoring means provided thereon which effects active clearing of the volatile memory of the chip card 10 also if a monitoring operation reveals that specific security conditions are fulfilled,
15 such as interruption of the system clock, the interruption of the delivery of supply energy or other indications for a possible attack, such as voltage fluctuations or the like. Consequently, the algorithm code, after utilization of the chip card 10 in the terminal 20 or interference with the communication sequence, is no longer present
20 on chip card 10 and thus is no longer exposed either to potential attacks and spying out by potential attackers. An attacker in possession of the chip card cannot carry out security computations on the basis of the complete algorithm code since the latter is not completely in the range
25 of access of the attacker. The spying out of keys or algorithms is thus effectively prevented.

After the sequence of operations during communication of a
30 chip card with a terminal has been described with reference to Fig. 1, various possibilities will be described first hereinafter as to which parts of an algorithm code are transferred from the terminal to the volatile memory of the chip card. In the event that the algorithm code contains
35 the program code of a secret, not yet known cryptographic algorithm, it may be advantageous for example to completely transfer the algorithm code from the terminal to the volatile memory of the chip card, whereby this secret cryptographic algorithm would be effectively protected against
40 spying out by a potential attacker.

5 In the event that the part transmitted or transferred of
the algorithm code contains part of a program code of a
known cryptographic algorithm, the transferred part of the
program code comprises, for example, memory addresses in
10 which the computation components underlying the cryptologic
computation are stored, thereby effectively preventing that
a potential attacker in possession of the chip card can
perform the security computations based on this crypto-
graphic algorithm, since the required memory addresses for
performing the program code and for performing the memory
15 accessing operations by the processor of the chip card,
which are necessary therefor, are missing.

In the event of a known cryptographic algorithm, the trans-
ferred part of the algorithm code may contain jump ad-
20 dresses pointing either as a start address to the beginning
of a specific program code or as conditional or uncondi-
tional program jumps to the beginnings of specific partial
routines. Without knowing these jump addresses, it is ren-
dered very difficult for an attacker to spy out the chip
25 card in his possession.

In a specific example, a plurality of program codes for
various cryptographic algorithms may be provided on the
chip card 10, with the transferred part of the algorithm
30 code containing a start address of a specific one of the
various cryptographic algorithm program codes that has just
been selected by the terminal. The terminal selects, for
example, for each new chip card terminal communication op-
eration a new cryptographic algorithm from the plurality of
35 cryptographic algorithms, or the selection is carried out
anew dynamically several times during a communication op-
eration in order to dynamically alter the cryptographic al-
gorithm selected.

40 It may be provided furthermore that the transferred part of
the algorithm code contains start addresses, jump addresses

5 or memory addresses of a program code that is necessary for debiting or crediting or for other functions of crucial security of the chip card. It is possible, furthermore, that steps 40, 50 and 60 illustrated in Fig. 1 are repeated, with the transferred part of the algorithm code being altered in a predetermined way. In each pass, the old part of the algorithm code stored in the volatile memory of the chip card is written over with the new transferred part of the algorithm code, which then is performed or run by the processor of the chip card. By way of this dynamic modification of the part of the algorithm code stored in the volatile memory, there is additional security obtained.

With reference to Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, possible embodiments for the construction of a chip card and a terminal, respectively, will be described hereinafter. Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of a chip card generally designated 100. Chip card 100 comprises a data interface 110, an energy interface 120, a RAM 130, a processor 140 and a ROM 150. The data interface 110 is adapted to be coupled to a terminal (not shown) for example via a contactless coupling or via a contact and is capable of transmitting data from the chip card to the terminal and, vice versa, of receiving data from the terminal. The data interface 110 is connected to processor 140 whereby the data to be transmitted and received can be transmitted to and from processor 140, respectively. The energy interface 120 is adapted to be coupled to the terminal as well in order to obtain from the terminal supply energy in the form of, for example, electromagnetic energy or a supply voltage. Energy interface 120 distributes the supply energy to the processor 140 and the RAM 130.

Processor 140 consists, for example, of a CPU (not shown) and a plurality of crypto coprocessors (not shown) that are controlled by the CPU and are designed for performing specific computations necessary for the one or more cryptographic algorithms implemented in chip card 100, such as

5 e.g. modular or arithmetic computations. In addition to control of the crypto coprocessors, the CPU carries out the communication with the terminal via data interface 110 as well as memory accessing operations to ROM 150 connected to processor 140. The ROM 150 contains, for example, chip card
10 specific information, e.g. a chip card identification number, a personal identification number, an account number, a balance or the like.

The CPU of processor 140 takes over the tasks for initial-
15 izing a communication of a terminal with the chip card 100, for authentication as well as for decryption and certificate examination upon receipt of the part of the algorithm code transferred according to the invention; a program code necessary therefor may be stored in ROM 150. For performing
20 the further communication with the terminal, e.g. for performing security-specific functions, such as the withdrawal of a balance stored in ROM 150, or a cryptographic algorithm for carrying out an account crediting/debiting transaction, the CPU of processor 140 is program-controlled by a
25 program code which, during communication of the chip card 100 with the terminal, according to the invention, is at least in part present in RAM 130 connected to processor 140, whereas it is otherwise not present at all or just in part in ROM 150 on the chip card 100. Consequently, a po-
30 tential attacker in possession of the chip card 100, as described hereinbefore, cannot carry out the security computations by way of processor 140, since parts of the algorithm code are missing and are stored in volatile memory 130 only upon communication of the chip card with the ter-
35 minal.

Fig. 3 shows a block diagram illustrating the terminal construction in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. The terminal, generally designated 200, com-
40 prises a data interface 210, an energy interface 220, a processor 230 connected to data interface 210 and energy

5 interface 220, as well as a memory 240 connected to processor 230. The data interface 210 is adapted to be coupled to the data interface of a corresponding chip card in order to carry out a data exchange between the terminal 200 and the chip card (not shown). The energy interface 220 is also
10 adapted to be coupled to an energy interface of the particular chip card in order to deliver supply energy thereto. Processor 230 controls, for example, the sequence of operations during communication of terminal 200 with the chip card and performs, for example, the initialization,
15 authentication, the encryption of the algorithm code to be transferred, which is stored in memory 240, the certification thereof as well as the transfer of the encrypted and certified algorithm code to the data interface 210 for transfer thereof to the chip card.

20

It is to be pointed out that memory 240 may already contain the algorithm code, for example, in encrypted form, so that the processor 230 need not encrypt the said code and the same is not present in uncoded text, neither in the memory
25 240 nor elsewhere.

With respect to the preceding description, it is pointed out that the same has referred to specific embodiments only. The mutual authentication and the encryption of the
30 part transferred of the algorithm code as well as the certification may be omitted in specific applications, for example. Due to the very measure according to the invention, that at least part of the algorithm code is stored in a volatile memory of the chip card, it is rendered very difficult
35 for a potential attacker to perform functions of crucial security of the chip card, such as e.g. encryption algorithms and access functions to chip card specific information, such as a balance etc., since these are not permanently stored on the chip card and thus are not in the
40 possession of the potential attacker, but rather are lost if supply energy is no longer received. The attempt of pro-

5 tecting the volatile memory against loss of this function
turns out to be very difficult and may be deemed to be not
realizable in practical application.

10 It is pointed out furthermore that the processes according
to the invention, the terminal according to the invention
as well as the chip card according to the invention may be
implemented in a variety of ways. The corresponding steps
or means may be implemented by way of software, firmware or
15 hardware in conjunction with non-volatile memories. In ad-
dition thereto, the term chip card, as utilized hereinbe-
fore, should not be restricted to the form of a card, but
rather is to comprise also all other forms of chip carriers
used in similar manner.

20 A current possibility of realization of the present inven-
tion consists, for example, in the processor of product
family SLE66CX320P of the company Infineon AG, which by way
of an MMU (MMU = Memory Management Unit) renders possible
to run a code stored in a RAM in that it controls memory
25 access operations to the RAM. In the simplest case, already
the transfer of encrypted jump addresses or memory ad-
resses from the terminal to the chip card would effec-
tively prevent that a "native code" or machine code can be
loaded by a potential attacker. Already with such a simple
30 realization of the present invention, an attacker would not
be able to perform the security computations in the chip
card, since the jump addresses and thus the sequences would
be unknown. This idea may be imparted to a customer of such
a component by drafting an application note, thereby in-
35 creasing the security of the application with corresponding
realization thereof in the controller software of the chip
card and in the terminal software.

40 Potential attackers in possession of a chip card according
to the invention just have the protected data, but they can
neither initiate an accounting operation nor exactly deter-

5 mine the algorithm code. In combination with secured terminals and intelligent access protection mechanisms with respect to the reloadability of program parts, the present invention thus achieves a very high level of security.